

GOVT 776: The Political Economy of Development

Spring 2023

Thursdays 2:40-5:20

Kerwin Hall 204

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Office hours: By appointment

This is a course for political science Ph.D. students, designed to introduce you to both the topics and methods at the heart of research on the political economy of development (PED). The main goal of the course is to examine why some countries are characterized by slow economic growth, weak state capacity, poor governance, and civil conflict. Each week we will focus on a different topic, starting by examining the role of historical legacies (e.g. colonial institutions and slavery) and regime type. We will then dive more deeply into how, when, and why various factors—weak accountability, clientelism, bureaucratic corruption, ethnic divisions, natural resource wealth, civil conflict, and foreign aid—undermine development. We will also consider the efficacy of potential policy solutions for overcoming these persistent barriers to economic, social, and political development. Along the way, you will gain exposure to the variety of methods used in political economy of development research, with a focus on experimental and quasi-experimental methods for causal inference.

This course stands at the intersection of political science and economics, as its name suggests. This means we will be reading extensively in both political science and economics, which can be challenging. We will read a combination of foundational and cutting-edge work to give you a sense not only of how the subfield has developed but also of research frontiers, the methodological approaches commonly used in this field, and possible topics for your own original research.

There are no formal prerequisites for this course, although previous exposure to quantitative methods for causal inference and formal modeling will be helpful.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

The three main goals of this course are:

1. To deepen your understanding of the current state of knowledge and research on the political economy of development;
2. To strengthen your abilities to be critical consumers, on both substantive and empirical grounds, of current PED research; and
3. To prepare you to conduct your own research, regardless of your field of interest. This includes developing your abilities to identify research questions, develop hypotheses, and come up with an empirical strategy for answering your research question that is both feasible and compelling.

TECHNOLOGY PLATFORMS

Canvas

We will use Canvas as the Learning Management System for this class. Among the things you will be able to find on Canvas as the semester progresses are:

- The syllabus
- The link to Zoom classes and office hours
- A link to Office hours sign-up.
- A weekly module including an overview of the readings, the pdfs of the assigned articles, and relevant links.
- The weekly discussion board (see below on participation)
- Detailed descriptions of the assignments.

Every week by the end of the day *on Friday* I will post to Canvas the module for the coming week. Each module will include an overview of the coming week, including an introduction to the readings and questions you should keep in mind as you read. You should start each week by reading the Overview carefully. **The readings in the syllabus are tentative, you should check Canvas for the final updated list of readings for each week.** I reserve the right to adjust the syllabus (on the margins) throughout the semester if I think that will lead to a better learning experience. The module will also contain everything else you'll need for the week, including supplementary readings, slides, links to recorded lectures, and discussion boards.

Zoom

We will use Zoom for virtual office hours and, if necessary, an online or hybrid class. Check the Welcome Module in Canvas for Zoom links that we will be using for this class.

COURSE MATERIALS

The syllabus is long but don't be intimidated! The recommended readings are meant to be a reference for those who want to dive deeper on any particular subject. You all *are* responsible, however, for doing the required readings (denoted with an asterisk *) before class. You should read these papers thoroughly and critically and come to class prepared to discuss them on theoretical and empirical grounds. There will be 4-5 articles/week and I will use the weekly overviews posted on Canvas to give you a sense of what to read for.

Several readings on this list are quite challenging and might expose you to approaches that you have not previously encountered in-depth. We will spend a fair amount of time discussing the empirical analysis in these papers so do your best while reading them. Appendix B to the syllabus contains a list of recommended methods readings that you can refer to throughout the course to learn more about these methods. While I will provide short methods lectures in the weeks they are introduced, you should also plan to work independently to try to understand this material. Most of the readings are articles that can be found online and are available for free. Book chapters that are required reading will be posted online on Canvas.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

The main goal of this class is to prepare you to consume and/or conduct research, especially on the political economy of development. The assignments you will complete this semester are all selected to help you towards this goal, while building some important professional skills in the process.

Class Participation (10%)

It should go without saying in a PhD class that active participation in every session is important. We also have an unusually small class, which makes attendance and participation at every session extra-important. Our weekly meetings will focus on in-depth discussions of the required readings. There will typically be about 4-5 readings each week. You should read these papers thoroughly and critically and come to class prepared to discuss. Your

goal should be to understand the main contributions of the individual pieces as well as how they relate to one another (within a topic and across topics).

In addition to weekly engagement in our seminars, your grade will take into account your weekly participation in an **online discussion board** I will create a weekly online discussion board in Canvas. Each of you should post one question to that board by noon on Wednesday. These questions can take any form—they can be big picture questions on the readings or detailed questions on the minutiae of an authors' empirical strategy. The main goal is for others in the class to see what stood out to you as interesting and thought-provoking. You can also build on questions posted by others and you should feel free to respond to your classmates as well. We will aim to discuss some or all of the questions that you raised during our actual sessions.

Presentation on a Reading (10%)

In the first part of the semester (Sessions 3-7), one student per week will do a presentation on one of the readings for the week. You will have 15 minutes (the length of a normal APSA presentation) to present the article (using slides) as if you were giving a talk. The goal of this assignment is to get you to really think about how to identify the most central information and convey it as succinctly and clearly as possible under a time constraint. Additionally, as part of your presentation, I want you to suggest a way that you might extend the analysis in the article. This is to give you practice with thinking about extension, which is a central part of your replication and extension assignment. You will also be an 'expert' on the article and help to guide the class discussion.

Reproduction and extension (30%)

Reproduction, or the practice of verifying findings in published papers, plays a central role in increasing research transparency and the credibility of research findings. **Extension** goes one step further in allowing researchers to test the robustness of published results or perform additional analysis that deepens the contribution of the paper. Both replication and extension are excellent ways to gain firsthand experience linking theory to empirics and implementing empirical research. The goal of this assignment is to help make more concrete the challenges and considerations of coming up with an empirical strategy for research.

This assignment will work as follows. I will designate a handful of articles in the second half of the course (Sessions 9-13) as eligible for replication and extension. Early in the semester you will be asked to rank order your preferences over these articles and I will use this to assign you to small groups of two or three. You will work in these small groups to complete the replication and extension for presentation in class on the day that we are discussing the article. Details on this assignment will be provided early in the semester. Generally, your small group will be responsible for a 20-minute presentation to the class that covers:

1. A short presentation of the paper (similar to what you're doing in Part I of the course).
2. Your attempt to reproduce the main findings in the published work.
3. Your attempt to produce any analysis that was pre-registered but that was *not* included in the main paper or in an online appendix.
4. At least one well-motivated extension to the original analysis

Each of you is expected to make a meaningful contribution to the replication and extension assignment described above. You can all work together on each component or you can divvy up tasks (must as with real-world co-authorship) but no one should be free-riding. After the completion of the assignment, I will ask each of you to submit a short peer assessment detailing what you and your co-author(s) contributed to the assignment, and this will be factored into your final grade.

Research Design (50%)

The main assignment for this course is a research design that will be submitted at the end of the semester. This research design will resemble the kind of document that you will one day need to submit for a dissertation proposal defense or a funding proposal. The goal is to give you a chance to put what you have learned this semester, both substantively and empirically, towards developing a convincing research design. Since you are not being asked to implement the empirical analysis, the focus is more on demonstrating how you approach original research. Detailed instructions will be provided but generally your design should include:

1. **Motivation:** What is your research question or the goal of the project. Why is this question/goal interesting and important? How will your proposed research contribute to understanding and existing knowledge on the subject?
2. **Theory and hypotheses:** What are your main hypotheses and how did you arrive at them?
3. **Empirical strategy:** What is your empirical strategy for testing your hypotheses? A complete discussion requires addressing how you will collect your data, your main variables and measures, and your plan for analyzing your data.
4. **Threats to inference:** What are the potential threats to inference with your research design? What, if anything, can you do to mitigate those threats?

You should be working on these throughout the semester to ensure a high-quality finished project. We will have regular check-ins on your progress during the semester. You should plan on submitting a first draft—which can be heavily focused on (1) and (2) above—by **Friday, March 3**. We will then discuss these in class during our session on **Wednesday, March 8**. You should submit a near final draft by **Friday, April 28** in time for final class presentations and discussant comments on **May 3**. Your final draft is due by **Friday, May 5**.

Each of you will be assigned to discuss one of your classmate’s projects during the sessions on March 8 and May 3. Just as you would if you were chosen to be a discussant on a panel or for a guest speaker, you should plan on reading your classmates’ draft proposal thoroughly and coming up with a set of constructive comments to improve the next version. This is meant to develop your professional skills as a political scientist as well as to ensure that each person in the class will get one set of thorough comments on their proposals.

GRADING POLICIES

Grading scale:

94-100	A	87-89	B+	77-79	C+	60-69	D
		84-86	B	74-76	C	<60	F
90-93	A-	80-83	B-	70-73	C-		

Late papers. It is very important that you not submit work late, especially for the group feedback sessions. If you need an extension, however, please email me with sufficient advance warning and also an explanation for why you are requesting an extension. Personal and family emergencies qualify; ‘I started too late’ is not a good look.

Re-grading policy: I encourage PhD students not to obsess over grades. Your actual learning and how you put that to use will be much more important in the long-run than percentage points and your GPA. With that said, you have one week after your graded work is returned to request a re-grade. You should submit a written statement to me via email explaining why you think your work deserves to be re-graded. Remember that after re-evaluating your work, your grade may remain unchanged or could be adjusted higher *or* lower.

OFFICE HOURS

Given that this is the only class I’m teaching this semester and there are only five of you, office hours will be by appointment. Please just email me to arrange a meeting.

UNIVERSITY POLICIES

Academic Integrity Code

All students are required to follow the University's Academic Integrity Code. If you have not already done so, please familiarize yourself with the standards and requirements of the University's Academic Code of Conduct. Violations of the Code of Conduct will not be tolerated and will be reported appropriately. You can find more information about the University's Academic Integrity Code here:

<http://www.american.edu/academics/integrity/code.cfm>

In addition to following the Academic Integrity Code, I want to make it crystal clear that graded assignments must be done individually. You cannot collaborate with fellow students on any paper or exam. Since the two exams will be done remotely, you are free to use your notes and any other sources you can find but you cannot collaborate with a fellow student in any way and you cannot plagiarize.

Other Policies

All University-wide policies apply to this course. For more detailed information on the university's policies on discrimination, emergency preparedness, and academic support and access for those with disabilities, see Appendix C below.

SCHEDULE OVERVIEW

- **Session 1 [Jan 18]:** What is development and how do we study it?
- **Session 2 [Jan 25]:** Historical legacies
- **Session 3 [Feb 01]:** State capacity
- **Session 4 [Feb 08]:** Democracy, dictatorship, and development
- **Session 5 [Feb 15]:** Democratization
- **Session 6 [Feb 22]:** Accountability
- **Session 7 [Mar 01]:** Clientelism
- **Session 8 [Mar 08]:** Draft design workshop/replication & extension workshop
- **Session 9 [Mar 22]:** Bureaucratic Performance
- **Session 10 [Mar 29]:** Conflict
- **Session 11 [Apr 05]:** Ethnic diversity
- **Session 12 [Apr 12]:** Natural resources
- **Session 13 [Apr 19]:** Foreign aid
- **Session 14 [Apr 26]:** Preparation for participating in NEWEPS on April 28
- **Session 15 [May 03]:** Final research design presentations

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF READINGS

Session 1 [Jan 18]: What is development and how do we study it?

Conceptualizing (and measuring) development

- *Acemoglu, Daron. 2008. *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*: Chapter 1 (pp. 3-27).
- *Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. Chapters 1-2 (pp. 13-53).

Macro vs. micro approaches to studying development and the causal inference revolution

- *Adam, Christopher and Stefan Dercon. 2009. "The political economy of development: an assessment" *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 25(2): 173-189. (Just read 173-179).
- *Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. 2012. *Poor Economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight global poverty*. Public Affairs. Chapter 10: 235-265 (skim).
- *Angus Deaton. 2020. "Randomization in the Tropics Revisited: A Theme and Eleven Variations" *NBER Working Paper 27600*. (skim this for a sense of the critique of RCTs)

Recommended

- Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. 2009. "The Experimental Approach to Development Economics," *The Annual Review of Economics*, pp. 151-178.
- Deaton, Angus. 2005. "Measuring Poverty in a Growing World (Or Measuring Growth in a Poor World)" *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(1): 1-19.
- Deaton, Angus. 2010. "Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development" *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(2): 424-455.
- Dunning, Thad. 2012. *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge University Press: Chapter 1 (pp. 1-38).
- Humphreys, Macartan and Alex Scacco. 2020. "The Aggregation Challenge" *World Development* 127: 1-3.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein. 2009. "Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development" *Annual Review of Political Science* 12(1): 367-378.
- Imbens, Guido. 2010. "Better LATE than Nothing: Some Comments on Deaton (2009) and Heckman and Urzua (2009)," *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(2): 399-423.
- Pritchett, Lant. 1997. "Divergence, Big Time" *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 11(3): 3-17.

Session 2 [Jan 25]: Historical legacies

- *Pierson, Paul. 2000. "Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics" *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 251-267.
- *Acemoglu and Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation" *American Economic Review* 91: 1369-1401.

- *Nunn, Nathan. 2008. “The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(1): 139-176.
- *Dell, Melissa. 2010. “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita,” *Econometrica* 78(6): 1863-1903.
- *Dell, Melissa, Nathan Lane and Pablo Querubin. 2018. “The Historical State, Local Collective Action, and Economic Development in Vietnam” *Econometrica* 86(6): 2083-2121.

Recommended

- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2006. “De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence” *American Economic Review* 96(2): 325-330.
- Acemoglu, Daron and Simon Johnson and James Robinson. 2005. “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth,” *Handbook of Economic Growth*: 385-472.
- Acemoglu, Daron Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4): 1231-1294.
- Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of the Colonial Land Tenure System in India” *American Economic Review* 95(4): 1190-1213.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Lakshmi Iyer and Rohini Somanathan. 2005. “History, Social Divisions and Public Goods in Rural India,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3: 639-647.
- Dell, Melissa. 2012. “Path Dependence in Development: Evidence from the Mexican Revolution” *Working paper*.
- Engerman, Stanley and Kenneth Sokoloff. 2008. “Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and Economic Development: Theory, History, and Findings” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 119-135.
- Hariri, Jacob Gerner. 2012. “The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood” *American Political Science Review* 106: 471-494.
- Huillery, Elise. 2009. “History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 1(2): 176-215.
- Kuran, Timur. 2003. “The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic Underdevelopment in the Middle East,” *Journal of Economic History* 63(2): 414-446.
- Iyer, Lakshmi. 2010. “Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences” *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4): 693-713.
- Lowes, Sara, Nathan Nunn, James Robinson, and Jonathan Weigel. 2017. “The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom” 85(4): 1065-1091.
- Mahoney, James. 2001. “Path-dependent explanations of regime change” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36(1): 111-41.
- Michalopoulos, Stelios and Elias Papaioannou. 2013. “Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development” *Econometrica* 81(1).

- North, Douglass. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nunn, Nathan. 2009. “The Importance of History for Economic Development,” *Annual Review of Economics* 1(1): 65-92.
- Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa” *American Economic Review* 101(7): 3221-3252.
- Tabellini, Guido. 2010. “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8(4): 677-716.

Session 3 [Feb 01]: The origins of strong states

- *North, Douglass and Barry Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England,” *The Journal of Economic History* XLIX(4): 803-832.
- *Herbst, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press (especially 3-58).
- *Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul. 2019. “On the Origins of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo” *Journal of Political Economy* 128(1): 32-74.
- ***Student presentation:** Weigel, Jonathan and Elie Kabue Ngindu. 2021. “The Taxman Cometh: Pathways out of a Low-Capacity Trap in the DR. Congo” (*working paper*).

Recommended

- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson and Rafael Santos. 2013. “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11: 5-44.
- Acemoglu, Daron and C. Garcia-Jimeno and James Robinson. 2015. “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach” *American Economic Review* 105(8): 2364-2409.
- Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. 2014. “Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action,” *Annual Review of Economics* 6: 951-971.
- Bardhan, Pranab. 2016. “State and Development: The need for a reappraisal of the current literature” *Journal of Economic Literature* 54(3): 862-892.
- Bates, Robert. 2008. “State Failure,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 1-12.
- Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson. 2009. “The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics” *American Economic Review* 99(4): 1218-1244.
- Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson. 2010. “State Capacity, Conflict, and Development,” *Econometrica* 78(1): 1-34.
- Centeno, Miguel Angel. 1997. “Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America” *The American Journal of Sociology* 102 (6): 1565-1605. (*skim*).

- Evans, Peter. 1995. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton University Press.
- Jackson, Robert and Carl Rosberg. 1986. "Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 24(1), pp. 1-31.
- Jackson, Robert and Carl Rosberg. 1982. "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics* 35(1): 1-24.
- Kohli, Atul. 2004. *State Directed Development*.
- Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *American Political Science Review*, 87:567-576.
- Robinson, James. 2002. "States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey Herbst: A Review Essay" *Journal of Economic Literature* XL: 510-519.
- Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. 2012. "Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation," *American Political Science Review* 106(1): 81-102.
- Spruyt, Hendrik. 2002. "The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State," *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 127-149.
- Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992* (especially 67-95).

Session 4 [Feb 08]: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Development

- *Acemoglu, Daron and Suresh Naidu and Pascual Restrepo and James Robinson. 2019. "Democracy Does Cause Growth" *Journal of Political Economy* 127(1): 47-100.
- *Doner, Richard and Bryan Ritchie and Dan Slater. 2005. "Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective," *International Organization* 59: 327-361.
- *Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith and Randolph Silverson and James Morrow. 2005. *The Logic of Political Survival*, chapters TBD.
- ***Student presentation:** [Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padro I Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. 2014. "Political Reform in China: Elections, Public Goods, and Income Distribution \(available at SSRN\).](#)

Recommended

- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2006. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective," *American Political Science Review* 100(1): 115-131.
- Acemoglu, Daron and T. Reed and James Robinson. 2014. "Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone," *Journal of Political Economy* 122(2): 319-368.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson and Thierry Verdier. 2004. "Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule" *Alfred Marshall Lecture Journal of the European Economic Association* 2(2-3): 162-192.

- Boix, Carles and Milan Svolik. 2013. “The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships,” *The Journal of Politics* 75:300-316.
- Fujiwara, Thomas. 2015. “Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil” *Econometrica* 83(2):423-464.
- Harding, Robin and David Stasavage. 2012. “What Democracy Does (And Doesn’t Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections” *Journal of Politics* 76(1): 229-245.
- Gallagher, Mary and Jonathan Hanson. 2015. “Power Tool or Dull Blade? Selectorate Theory for Autocracies” *Annual Review of Political Science* 18: 367-385.
- Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler, and Anh Tran. 2012. “The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly,” *American Political Science Review*, 106:762-786.
- Olken, Ben. 2010. “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” *American Political Science Review* 104(2): 243-267.
- Padro i Miguel, Gerard. 2008. “The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear,” *Review of Economic Studies* 74(4): 1259-1274.
- Papaioannou, Elias and Gregorios Siourounis. 2008. “Democratisation and Growth” *The Economic Journal* 118: 1520-1551.
- Tsai, Lily. 2007. “Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China,” *American Political Science Review* 101(2): 355-372.
- Wright, Joseph. 2008. “Do Authoritarian Legislatures Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment” *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 322-343.

Session 5 [Feb 15]: Democratization

- *Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2009. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, especially Chapter 1-4, 6 (pp. 1-117, 173-220).
- ***Student presentation:** Aidt, Toke and Raphael Franck. 2015. “Democratization and the Threat of Revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832” *Econometrica* 83(2): 505-547.
- *Papaioannou, Elias and Gregorios Siourounis. 2008. “Economic and Social Factors Driving the Third Wave of Democratization” *Journal of Comparative Economics* 36: 365-387.
- *Friedman, Willa, Michael Kremer, Edward Miguel, Rebecca Thornton. 2011. “Education as Liberation” No. w16939. *National Bureau of Economic Research*.

Recommended

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Pierre Yared. 2008. “Income and Democracy,” *American Economic Review* 98(3): 808-842.
- Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.
- Boix, Carles. 2011. “Democracy, Development, and the International System,” *American Political Science Review* 105(4): 809-28.

- Bruckner, M and Ciccone, A. 2011. “Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity,” *Econometrica* 79(3): 923-947.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960/1981. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour. 1959. “Some Social Prerequisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” *American Political Science Review* 53:69-105.
- Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico. 2004. “Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain’s ‘Age of Reform’” 119(2): 707-765.
- Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Beacon Press.
- Przeworski, Adam and Michael Alvarez and Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990*. Cambridge University Press.

Session 6 [Feb 22]: Accountability, corruption, and information

- *Fearon, James. 1999. “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians” in *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation* edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. pp. 55-97.
- *Ferraz, Claudio and Fred Finan. 2008. “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes” *Quarterly Journal of Economic* 123(2): 703-745.
- *Dunning, Thad, Guy Grossman, Macartan Humphreys, Susan Hyde, Craig McIntosh, and Gareth Nellis. 2019. *Information, Accountability, and Learning: Lessons from Metaketa I*. Cambridge University Press
OR Dunning et al “Voter Information Campaigns and Political Accountability: Cumulative Findings from a Pre-Registered Meta-Analysis of Coordinated Trials” *Science Advances*.
- ***Student presentation:** Adida, Claire, Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon, and Gwyneth McClendon. 2019. “When Does Information Influence Voters? The Joint Importance of Salience and Coordination” *Comparative Political Studies* 53(6).

Recommended

- Banerjee, Abhijit et al. 2014. “Are Poor Voters Indifferent to Whether Elected Leaders are Criminal or Corrupt? A Vignette Experiment in Rural India,” *Political Communications* 41: 391-407.
- Besley, Timothy. 2006. *Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government*. Oxford University Press.
- Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. 1997. “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(1): 85-114.
- Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess. 2002. “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(4): 1415-1451.
- Besley, Timothy. 2005. “Political Selection,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19(3): 43-60.

- Callen, Michael and James Long. 2015. "Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," *American Economic Review* 105: 354-381.
- Chattopadhyay, Raghavendra and Esther Duflo. 2004. "Women as Policymakers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India" *Econometrica* 72(5): 1409-1443.
- Chong, Alberto, Ana de la O, Dean Karlan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2015. "Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification" *Journal of Politics* 77(1): 55-71.
- Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan. January 2011. "Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance" (working paper).
- Gottlieb, Jessica. "Greater Expectations: A Field Experiment to Improve Accountability in Mali" *American Journal of Political Science* 60(1): 143-157.
- Liaqat, Asad. 2019. "No Representation without Information: Politician Responsiveness to Citizen Preferences" *Working paper available [here](#)*.
- Olken, Ben. 2007. "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," *Journal of Political Economy* 115(2): 200-249.
- Pande, Rohini. 2011. "Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies" *Annual Review of Economics* 3: 215-237.
- Wittman, Donald. 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results" *Journal of Political Economy* 97(6): 1395-1424.

Session 7 [Mar 1]: Clientelism

- *Stokes, Susan and Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press: Chapters 1-3, skim 6 and 8.
- *Leonard Wantchekon. 2003. "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin," *World Politics*, 55:399-422.
- ***Student presentation:** Auerbach, Adam and Tariq Thatchil. 2018. "How Clients Select Brokers: Competition and Choice in India's Slums" *American Political Science Review* 112(4): 775-791. (**Note:** Prof. Auerbach will be coming to join our session and discuss the article.)

Recommended

- Anderson, Siwan, Patrick Francois, and Ashok Kotwal. 2015. "Clientelism in Indian Villages" *American Economic Review* 105(6): 1780-1816.
- Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2004. "Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine electoral market." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.4: 742-757.
- Cammett, Melani and Sukriti Issar. 2010. "Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logic of Welfare Allocation in Lebanon," *World Politics* 62(3): 381-421.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2007. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge University Press.

- De la O, Ana. 2013. “Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57(1): 1-14.
- Fujiwara, Thomas and Leonard Wantchekon. 2013. “Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin,” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*. 5(4): 241-255.
- Gottlieb, Jessica. 2017. “Explaining Variation in Broker Strategies: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Senegal,” *Comparative Political Studies* 50(11): 1556-1592.
- Hicken, Allen. 2011. “Clientelism” *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 289-310.
- Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven Wilkinson. 2007. “Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction,” in *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* (ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson). Cambridge University Press.
- Manzetti, Luigi and Carole Wilson. 2007. “Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?” *Comparative Political Studies* 40: 949-970.
- Nichter, Simeon. 2008. “Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot,” *American Political Science Review*, 102:19-31.
- Robinson, James and Thierry Verdier. 2013. “The Political Economy of Clientelism,” *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 115:260-291.
- Stokes, Susan. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina,” *American Political Science Review*, 99:315-325.

Session 8 [March 08]: Research design workshop and intro to replication and extension

Details forthcoming

Session 9 [March 22]: Bureaucratic Corruption and Performance

Tara Slough’s paper on inequality

- *Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishney. 1993. “Corruption,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108(3): 599-617 (skim).
- *Bertrand, Marianne, Djankov, Simeon, Hanna, Rema and Mullainathan, Sendhil, (2007) "Obtaining a Driver’s License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(4), 1639-1676.
- *Gulzar, Saad and Benjamin Pasquale. 2017. “Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India” *American Political Science Review* 111(1): 162-183.
- *Raffler, Pia. 2020. “Does Political Oversight of the Bureaucracy Increase Accountability? Field Experimental Evidence from an Electoral Autocracy” *Working paper*.
- *Slough, Tara 2022. “Bureaucratic Quality and Electoral Accountability” (working paper)

Recommended

- Bandiera, Oriana, Andrea Prat, and Tommaso Valletti (2009), "Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment," *American Economic Review*, 99 (4): 1278-1308.
- Banerjee, Abhijit et al. 2012. "Improving Police Performance in Rajasthan, India: Experimental Evidence on Incentives, Managerial Autonomy, and Training," *NBER Working Paper 17912*.
- Bardhan, Pranab. 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," *Journal of Economic Literature* 35: 1320-1346.
- Callen, Michael et al. 2015. "Personalities and Public Sector Performance: Evidence from a Health Experiment in Pakistan," *NBER Working Paper 21180*.
- Dal Bo, Ernesto and Federico Finan and Marin Rossi. 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128(3): 1169-1218.
- Finan, Federico and Ben Olken and Rohini Pande. 2015. "The Personnel Economics of the State," *NBER Working Paper 21825*.
- Fisman, Ray. 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," *American Economic Review*, 91: 1095-1102.
- Khan, Adnan and Asim Kwaja and Ben Olken. 2016. "Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*: 219-271.
- Martin, Lucy and Pia Raffler. Forthcoming. "Fault Lines: How Citizens Assign Blame for Failures in Public Service Provision" *American Journal of Political Science*. Available [here](#).
- Olken, Ben and Rohini Pande. 2012. "Corruption in Developing Countries," *Annual Review of Economics* 4: 479-509.
- Olken, Benjamin and Barron, Patrick (2009), "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh," *Journal of Political Economy* 117(3), 417-452.
- Reinikka, Ritva and Svennson, Jacob. 2004. "Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119: 679-705.
- Slough, Tara. 2022. "Squeaky Wheels and Inequality in Bureaucratic Service Provision." (working paper)
- Treisman, Daniel. 2007. "What have we Learned about the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 211-244.

Session 10 [March 29]: Conflict and Crime

- *Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4): 563-595 (*skim*).
- *Bazzi, Samuel and Chris Blattman. 2014. "Economic Shocks and Conflict: Evidence from Commodity Prices" *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 6(4): 1-38.

- *Blattman, Chris and Jeannie Annan. 2016. "Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High Risk Men in a Fragile State," *American Political Science Review* 110(1): 1-17.

Recommended

- Balcells, Laia and Patricia Justino. 2014. "Bridging Micro and Macro Approaches on Civil Wars and Political Violence: Issues, Challenges and the Way Forward," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(8): 1343-1359.
- Besley, Timothy and Hannes Mueller. 2012. "Estimating the Peace Dividend: The impact of violence on house prices in Northern Ireland," *American Economic Review* 102(2): 810-833.
- Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson. 2011. "The Logic of Political Violence" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 126(3): 1411-45.
- Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson. 2010. "State Capacity, Conflict, and Development" *Econometrica* 78(1): 1-34.
- Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. 2010. "Civil war," *Journal of Economic Literature*, 3-57.
- Blattman, Chris and Julian Jamison and Margaret Sheridan. 2017. "Reducing Crime and Violence: Experimental Evidence on Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in Liberia," *American Economic Review*.
- Blattman, Chris. 2009. "From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda," *American Political Science Review* 103: 231-247.
- Dube, O., & Vargas, J. F. 2013. "Commodity price shocks and civil conflict: Evidence from Colombia," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 80(4), 1384-1421.
- Fearon, James and David Laitin. 2003. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 75-90 (skim).
- Gilligan, Mike and Ben Pasquale and Cyrus Samii. 2014. "Civil War and Social Cohesion: Lab-in-the-field Evidence from Nepal," *American Journal of Political Science* 58(3): 604-619.
- Grossman, Guy and M. Devorah and D. Miodownik. Forthcoming. "The Political Legacies of Combat: Attitudes Towards War and Peace among Israeli Ex-Combatants," *International Organization*.
- Grossman, Herschell. 1991. "A General Equilibrium Model of Insurrections." *American Economic Review* 81(4): 912-21.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein. 2008. "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 436-455.
- Jha, Saumitra and Steven Wilkinson. 2012. "Does Combat Experience Foster Organizational Skill? Evidence from Ethnic Cleansing during the Partition of South Asia," *American Political Science Review* 106(4): 883-907.
- Kalyvas, Stathis. 2006. *The Logic of Civil War*. Cambridge University Press.
- Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," *Journal of Political Economy* 112 (4): 725-753.

- Voors, Maarten et al. 2012. “Violent Conflict and Behavior: A Field Experiment in Burundi,” *The American Economic Review* 102(2): 941-964.
- Weinstein, Jeremy. 2005. “Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49: 598-624.

Session 11 [Apr 05]: Ethnic identity

What is ethnic identity?

- *Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. “What is Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 9: 397-424.

Ethnic diversity on conflict, public goods provision, governance

- *Horowitz, Donald. 2000. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press: Chapter 1 (esp 41-54 for definition of ethnic identity), Chapter 4, and Chapter 7 (skim for main ideas).
- *Frank, Raphael and Ilia Rainer. 2012. “Does the Leader’s Ethnicity Matter? Ethnic Favoritism, Education, and Health in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *APSR* 106(2): 294-325.
- *Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2007. “Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?” *American Political Science Review* 101(4): 709-725.

Strategies for mitigating ethnic divisions

- *Scacco, Alexandra and Shana Warren. 2018. “Can Social Contact Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria” *American Political Science Review*

Recommended

- Adida, Claire, Jessica Gottlieb, Eric Kramon, and Gwyneth McClendon. Reducing or Reinforcing In-Group Preferences? An Experiment on Information and Ethnic Voting. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 12(4):437–477, 2017.
- Baldwin, Kate, and John D. Huber. 2010. "Economic versus cultural differences: Forms of ethnic diversity and public goods provision." *American Political Science Review* 104.4: 644-662.
- Bazzi, Samuel, Arya Gaduh, Alexander Rothenberg, Maisy Wong. 2019 “Unity in Diversity? How Intergroup Contact Can Foster Nation-Building” *American Economic Review* 109(11): 3978-4025.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2007. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge University Press.
- Corstange, Daniel. 2013. “Ethnicity on the Sleeve and Class in the Heart” *British Journal of Political Science* 43(4): 889-914.
- Easterly, William and Ross Levine. 1997. “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4): 1203-1223.
- Fearon, James and David Laitin. 1996. “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review*, 90:715-735.
- Goren. E. 2014. “How Ethnic Diversity Affects Economic Growth,” *World Development* 59: 275-297.

- Jeon, Sangick and Tim Johnson and Amanda Robinson. 2017. “Nationalism and Social Sanctioning Across Ethnic Lines: Experimental Evidence from the Kenya-Tanzania Border.” *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 4: 1-20.
- Kramon, Eric and Dan Posner. 2013. “Who Benefits from Distributive Politics? How the Outcomes One Studies Affect the Answer One Gets,” *Perspectives on Politics* 11(2): 461-474.
- Miguel, Edward. 2004. “Tribe or Nation? Nation-building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania,” *World Politics* 56: 327-362.
- Miguel, Edward and Mary Kay Gugerty. 2005. “Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions, and Public Goods in Kenya,” *Journal of Public Economics* 89(11-12): 2325-2368.
- Padro-i-Miguel, Gerard. 2008. “The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear,” *Review of Economic Studies* 74(4): 1259-1274.
- Paluck, Elizabeth and Donald Green. 2009. “Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and Assessment of Research and Practice,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 60: 339-67.
- Posner, Dan. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rainer, Francois and F. Trebbi. 2012. “How is Power Shared in Africa?” *Econometrica* 83(2): 465-503.
- Robinson, Amanda Lea. 2014. “National versus Ethnic Identification in Africa: Modernization, Colonial Legacy, and the Origins of Territorial Nationalism,” *World Politics* 66(4): 709-746.
- Robinson, Amanda Lea. 2016. “Nationalism and Interethnic Trust: Experimental Evidence from an African Border Region,” *Comparative Political Studies*.

Session 12 [Apr 12]: Natural resources

The political resource curse

- *Brollo, Fernanda, Tommaso Nannicini, Roberto Perotti, and Guido Tabellini. 2013. “The Political Resource Curse,” *American Economic Review* 103(5): 1759-1796.
- *Paler, Laura. 2013. “Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Taxes, Windfalls, and the Incentives to Restrain Government,” *American Political Science Review* 104(7): 706-725.

The conflict resource curse

- *Berman, Nicolas, Mathieu Couttenier, Dominic Rohner, and Mathias Thoenig. 2017. “This Mine is Mine! How Minerals Fuel Conflict in Africa” *American Economic Review* 107(6): 1564-1610.
- *Basedau, Matthias and Jan Pierskalla. 2014. “How ethnicity conditions the effect of oil and gas on civil conflict: A Spatial Analysis of Africa from 1990 to 2010.” *Political Geography* 38: 1-11.

Recommended

- Carreri, Maria and Oendriela Dube. 2017. “Do Natural Resources Influence Who Comes to Power, and How?” *Journal of Politics*. 79(2): 502-518.

- Caselli, Francesco and Tom Cunningham. 2009. "Leader Behavior and the Natural Resource Curse" *Oxford Economic Papers* 61(4): 628-650.
- Christensen, Darin. 2015. "Concession Stands: How Foreign Direct Investment Incites Protest in Africa" (working paper)
- Cotet, Anca and Kevin Tsui. 2013. "Oil and conflict: What does the cross-country evidence really show?" *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 5(1): 49-80.
- Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. Cambridge University Press.
- Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo. 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse." *American Political Science Review* 105(1): 1-24.
- Humphreys, Macartan. 2005. "Natural Resources, conflict, and conflict resolution: Uncovering the Mechanisms," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 508-37 (*skim*).
- Le Billon, Phillipe. 2001. "The Political ecology of war: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts," *Political Geography* 20: 561-584.
- Lujala, Paivi. 2009. "Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the Severity of Armed Civil Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(1): 50-71.
- Mahdavi, Paasha. 2015. "Explaining the Oil Advantage: Effects of Natural Resource Wealth on Incumbent Re-election in Iran," *World Politics* 67(2): 226-67.
- Martinez, Luis. 2019. "Sources of Revenue and Government Performance: Evidence from Colombia" *Working Paper available [here](#)*.
- Mehlum, H and K. Moene and R. Torvik. 2006. "Institutions and the Resource Curse" *The Economic Journal* 116(508): 1-20.
- Paine, Jack. 2015. "Rethinking the Conflict Resource Curse: How Oil Wealth Prevents Center-Seeking Civil Wars" *International Organization* 70(4): 727-761.
- Paine, Jack. 2017. "A Theory of Oil-Conflict Curse: Greed, Grievances, and Separatist Civil Wars" *working paper available [here](#)*.
- Robinson, James and Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. 2006. "Political Foundations of the Resource Curse," *Journal of Development Economics*, 79(2): 447-468.
- Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics*, 53:325-361.
- Ross, Michael. 2012. *The Oil Curse*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3 and 5.
- Ross, Michael. 2015. "What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 18: 239-259.
- Snyder, Richard and Rikhil Bavnani. 2005. "Blood, Diamonds, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 563-597.
- Steinberg, Jessica. 2015. "Strategic Sovereignty: A Model of Non-State Goods Provision and Resistance in Regions of Natural Resource Extraction," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

- Weigel, Jonathan. 2020. “The Participation Dividend of Taxation: How Citizens in Congo Engage More with the State When it Tries to Tax them” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 135(4): 1849-1903.

Session 13 [Apr 21]: Foreign Aid

The political aid curse

- *Djankov, Simeon and Jose Montalvo and Marta Reynol-Querol. 2008. “The Curse of Aid” *Journal of Economic Growth* 13(3) 169-194 (*skim*).
- *Wright, Joseph. 2009. “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes” *American Journal of Political Science* 53(3): 552-571.

The conflict aid curse

- *Nunn, Nathan and Nancy Qian. 2014. “U.S. Food Aid and Civil Conflict,” *American Economic Review*. 104(6): 1630-1666.
- *Crost, Benjamin and Joseph Felter and Patrick Johnston. 2014. “Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict” *American Economic Review* 104(6) 1833-1856.

Recommended

- Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. 2000. “Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?” *Journal of economic growth*, 5(1), 33-63.
- Banerjee et al. 2015 (January). “The Power of Transparency: Information, Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia” (working paper).
- Beath, Andrew, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov. 2013. “Winning Hearts and Minds through Development: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. *Working paper*.
- Burnside, Craig and David Dollar. 2000. “Aid, Policies, and Growth” *American Economic Review* 90(4): 847-868.
- De Juan, Alexander. 2019. “Heterogeneous Effects of Development Aid on Violent Unrest in Postwar Countries: Village-Level Evidence from Nepal. *International Studies Quarterly*.
- Easterly, William. 2009. "Can the West Save Africa?" *Journal of Economic Literature* 47.2: 373-447.
- Grossman. 1991 “A general equilibrium model of insurrections” *American Economic Review* 81(4): 912-921.
- Humphreys, Macartan, James Fearon, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2009. “Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia” *American Economic Review* 99(2): 287-291.
- Humphreys, Macartan, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, and Peter Van der Windt. 2019. “Exporting Democratic Practices: Evidence from a Village Governance Intervention in Eastern Congo” *Journal of Development Economics* 140(2019): 279-301.

- Nielsen, Richard et al. 2011. “Foreign aid shocks as a cause of violent armed conflict,” *American Journal of Political Science* 55(2): 219-232.
- Radelet, Steven. 2006. “A Primer on Foreign Aid,” *Center for Global Development Working Paper 92*. Washington, D.C.
- Sexton, Renard. 2016. “Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Contested and Controlled Territory in Afghanistan” *American Political Science Review* 110(4): 731-749.
- Wright, Joseph and Matthew Winters. 2010. “The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 61-80.
- *Zurcher, Chrisoph. 2017. “What Do We (Not) Know about Development Aid and Violence? A Systematic Review” *World Development* 98: 506-522.

Session 14 [Apr 26]: NEWEPS preparation

Session 15 [May 03]: Final research design presentation

APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL METHODS READINGS

Methods

Causal Inference (general)

- Angrist, Joshua and Jorn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Economics*. Princeton University Press.
- Imbens, Guido and Donald Rubin. 2015. *Causal Inference for Statistics, Social, and Biomedical Sciences*. Cambridge University Press.
- Morgan, Stephen and Christopher Winship. 2007. *Counterfactuals and Causal Inference*. Cambridge University Press.
- Pearl, Judea. "Causal inference in statistics: An overview." *Statistics Surveys*3 (2009): 96-146.

Panel and cross-country time series

- Angrist & Pischke, Sections 1, 2, 3.1, 3.2, and 5.1
- Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N. Katz. "What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section data." *American Political Science Review* (1995): 634-647.
- Beck, Neal. 2001. "Time Series Cross Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (1):271-93.
- Wilson, Sven E., and Daniel M. Butler. "A lot more to do: The sensitivity of time-series cross-section analyses to simple alternative specifications." *Political Analysis* 15.2 (2007): 101-123.
- Chapters 1 and 2 of Deaton, Angus. 1997. [The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconomic Approach to Development Policy](#). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press & The World Bank.
- Chamberlain, Gary, Griliches Zvi, and D. Intriligator Michael. 1984. "Panel data." In *Handbook of Econometrics*: Elsevier.
- Levine, R., and D. Renelt. 1991. "Cross-country studies of growth and policy: methodological, conceptual, and statistical problems." *Policy Research Working Paper Series*.

Experiments (Field, natural, lab)

- Gerber, Alan and Donald Green. 2012. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation*. W.W. Norton and Co.
- Dunning, Thad. 2012. *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach*. Cambridge University Press.
- Sekhon, Jasjeet and Rosio Titiumik. 2012. "When Natural Experiments are Neither Natural nor Experiments" *American Political Science Review* 106(1): 35-57.
- Morton, Rebecca and Kenneth Williams. 2010. *Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab*. Cambridge University Press.

Instrumental Variables

- Sovey, Allison and Don Green. 2011. "Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science: A Reader's Guide" *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1): 188-200.
- Murray, M. P. 2006. "Avoiding Invalid Instruments and Coping with Weak Instruments." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20 (4):111-32.
- Heckman, James J., and Sergio Urzua. "Comparing IV with structural models: What simple IV can and cannot identify." *Journal of Econometrics* 156.1 (2010): 27-37.
- Guido Imbens and Joshua Angrist. 1994. "Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects." *Econometrica* Vol. 62 No. 2 (March):467-475.
- Joshua Angrist and Alan Krueger. 2001. "Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* Vol. 15 No. 4 (Autumn): 69-85.
- Thad Dunning. 2008. Model Specification in Instrumental-Variables Regression. *Political Analysis* 16 (3): 290-302.

- Murray, Michael P. 2006. "[The Bad, the Weak, and the Ugly: Avoiding the Pitfalls of Instrumental Variables Estimation](#)." Bates College unpublished working paper.
- Larry Bartels. 1991. "Instrumental and "Quasi-Instrumental" Variables." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 35 No. 3 (August):777-800.
- Hahn, J., and J. Hausman. 2003. "Weak Instruments: Diagnosis and Cures in Empirical Econometrics." *American Economic Review* 93 (2):118-25.
- Bound, John, David A. Jaeger, and Regina M. Baker. "Problems with instrumental variables estimation when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous explanatory variable is weak." *Journal of the American statistical association* 90.430 (1995): 443-450.
- Angrist, Joshua D., Guido W. Imbens, and Donald B. Rubin. "Identification of causal effects using instrumental variables." *Journal of the American statistical Association* 91.434 (1996): 444-455.

Regression Discontinuity

- Lee, David and Thomas Lemieux. 2010. "Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics" *Journal of Economic Literature* 48: 281-355.
- Imbens, Guido W., and Thomas Lemieux. 2008. "[Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice](#)." *Journal of Econometrics* 142.2: 615-635.

Difference-in-difference (and synthetic controls)

- Angrist & Pischke, Sections 3.3, 3.4, 5.2, 5.3, 8.2
- Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller. "Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California's Tobacco Control Program." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 105.490 (2010): 493-505.
- Conley, Timothy G., and Christopher R. Taber. "Inference with "difference in differences" with a small number of policy changes." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 93.1 (2011): 113-125.
- Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo, and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (February):249-275.
- Stephen Donald and Kevin Lang. 2007. "Inference with Difference-in-Differences and Other Panel Data." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 89 (2): 221-233.

Matching

- Sekhon, Jasjeet S. "Opiates for the matches: Matching methods for causal inference." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009): 487-508.
- Caliendo, Marco, and Sabine Kopeinig. "Some practical guidance for the implementation of propensity score matching." *Journal of economic surveys* 22.1 (2008): 31-72.
- Jasjeet Sekhon. Forthcoming. "The Neyman-Rubin Model of Causal Inference and Estimation via Matching Methods." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Paul Rosenbaum and Donald Rubin. 1983. "The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects." In Donald Rubin. 2006. *Matched Sampling for Causal Effects*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 10.
- Donald Rubin and Neal Thomas. 1996. "Matching Using Estimated Propensity Scores: Relating Theory to Practice." In Donald Rubin. 2006. *Matched Sampling for Causal Effects*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 17.

Popular Books on Development

- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. *Why Nations Fail*. Crown Business, 2012.
- Diamond, Jared. *Guns, Germs, and Steel*. W.W. Norton & Company, 1999.
- Easterly, William. *The Elusive Quest for Growth*. MIT Press, 2002.
- Easterly, William. 2007. *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good*. Penguin Books.
- Collier, Paul. 2008. *The Bottom Billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it*. Oxford University Press.

- Piketty, Thomas. 2014. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Belknap Press.
- Radelet, Stephen. 2015. *The Great Surge: The Ascent of the Developing World*. Simon and Schuster.
- Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. 2012. *Poor Economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight global poverty*. Public Affairs.
- Sachs, Jeffrey. 2005. *The End of Poverty*. Penguin Books.

Appendix C: University Policies

Prohibition against Discriminatory Harassment

American University expressly prohibits any form of discriminatory harassment including sexual harassment, dating and domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking. The university is an equal opportunity, affirmative action institution that operates in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex (including pregnancy), age, sexual orientation, disability, marital status, personal appearance, gender identity and expression, family responsibilities, political affiliation, source of income, veteran status, an individual's genetic information or any other bases under federal or local laws in its programs and activities. If you experience any of the above, you have the option of filing a report with the AU Department of Public Safety (202-885-2527) or the Office of the Dean of Students (dos@american.edu or 202-885-3300). Please keep in mind that all faculty and staff – with the exception of counselors in the Counseling Center, staff in the Office of Advocacy Services for Interpersonal and Sexual Violence, medical providers in the Student Health Center, and ordained clergy in the Kay Spiritual Life Center – who are aware of or witness this conduct are required to report this information to the university, regardless of the location of the incident. For more information, including a list of supportive resources on and off-campus, contact OASIS: The Office of Advocacy Services for Interpersonal and Sexual Violence (www.american.edu/sexualassault, oasis@american.edu or 202-885-7070), or the Office of the Dean of Student (www.american.edu/ocl/dos).

Emergency Preparedness

In an emergency, AU will implement a plan for meeting the needs of all members of the university community. Should the university be required to close for a period of time, we are committed to ensuring that all aspects of our educational programs will be delivered to our students. These may include altering and extending the duration of the traditional term schedule to complete essential instruction in the traditional format and/or use of distance instructional methods. Specific strategies will vary from class to class, depending on the format of the course and the timing of the emergency. Faculty will communicate class-specific information to students via AU e-mail and Blackboard, while students must inform their faculty immediately of any absence due to illness. Students are responsible for checking their AU e-mail regularly and keeping themselves informed of emergencies. In the event of a declared pandemic or other emergency, students should refer to the AU Web site (<http://www.american.edu/emergency/>) and the AU information line at (202) 885-1100 for general university- wide information, as well as contact their faculty and/or respective dean's office for course and school/college- specific information.

Disability Services

The Academic Support and Access Center (ASAC) supports the academic development and educational goals of all American University students and is committed to providing access for individuals with disabilities within the university's diverse community. Please contact me and ASAC as soon as possible if you would like to arrange access to disability resources and services, including for test-taking. ASAC is located in the Mary Graydon Center (MGC), Room 243 x3360 Fax: x1042 asac@american.edu M–F: 9am–5pm
Website: <http://www.american.edu/ocl/asac/>