

# PS2370: Research Topics in the Political Economy of Development

Spring 2020  
Wednesday 2:00-4:30  
Posvar Hall 4430

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This course is designed to expose Ph.D. students to contemporary research on the political economy of development. The course is loosely organized in two parts. The first part explores the origins of strong states and democratic political institutions and examines their role in facilitating development. The second part focuses on how, when, and why various factors—weak accountability, clientelism, bureaucratic corruption, ethnic divisions, natural resource wealth, civil conflict, and foreign aid—contribute to underdevelopment. We will also consider the efficacy of potential policy solutions for overcoming these persistent barriers to economic, social, and political development.

This course stands at the intersection of political science and economics, as its name suggests. While we will read some seminal works in both fields, we will focus primarily on cutting-edge research with the goal of introducing you to research frontiers, to the methodological approaches commonly used in this field, and to possible topics for original research of your own. Our focus will be on major themes and subjects, not on specific countries or regions.

## PREREQUISITES

There are no formal prerequisites for this course, although previous exposure to methods for causal inference and formal modeling will be helpful.

## COURSE REQUIREMENTS

You have two options for the set of requirements that you need to fulfill as part of this course. **Option 1** is for students who want to focus on developing their research design skills. This is the appropriate option for students who are encountering this material for the first time or who are keen to improve foundational skills. **Option 2** is for advanced students who are prepared to work independently and would like to have a polished research paper by the end of the course. This option is especially appropriate for students who are taking this course after completing 3014/PS 2374 offered in GSPIA. Please notify me by **Thursday, January 15** of your decision.

### Option 1

- **Research proposal (50%):** The main assignment for this course is a research proposal (about 15-20 pages), which will be due on **Sunday, April 26**. This is not meant to be a polished research paper, nor do you have to do any actual empirical analysis. This is meant to be an opportunity for you to identify a question that you find interesting and important and to come up with a suitable research design. This resembles what you will have to do for your dissertation proposal or future funding proposals; it could also be the foundation for your second-year MA papers.

Your proposal should be related to the political economy of development. As such, it should not focus on OECD countries, unless you want to take a historical approach to understanding how these countries developed. As with any research proposal, your final proposal should take seriously the following:

- i. **Framing:** What is the broad subject matter you are interested in and why is it important from an academic perspective, policy perspective, or both. This is about selling your broader subject area to your audience.
- ii. **Research question:** What is your specific research question and what puzzle, debate, or gap in the literature does it speak to? Why is your specific research question both interesting and important to try to answer? This is about selling the specific focus of your paper to your audience.
- iii. **Lit review:** What existing studies provide insights or help to address your research question? Why is the extant literature insufficient or in need of your contribution? The lit review is crucial to motivating the research question. Remember that the lit review should not assume familiarity with the subject on the part of the reader, so you need to be both complete but also succinct. A good lit review demonstrates expertise on the subject (shows that you know all the relevant literature) but is also focused and to the point.
- iv. **Theory and hypotheses:** What are the main hypotheses that you propose to test? How did you arrive at these hypotheses? Are you testing an original theory or an existing theory? In either case, provide a clear explanation of what your theory is and how it produces your hypotheses (how does the IV relate to the DV, what are the mechanisms, is the effect conditional, etc).
- v. **Empirical strategy:** Describe an appropriate empirical strategy for testing your hypotheses. Remember, you are not being asked to conduct the data analysis; rather, I want to see how you are thinking about an appropriate research design. You should discuss what data you will collect, what model you will estimate, what your identification strategy will be (if you have one), how you will measure key concepts, etc. You should also think about the inferential challenges associated with your estimation strategy and how you might tackle them.

You should plan on submitting the first draft of your lit review and research question (parts i-iii above) by **Thursday, Feb 5**. That means that if you are working on a subject area that comes up later in the semester, you should plan on reading ahead. A 2-3 page memo providing an overview of your entire proposal is due by **Thursday, March 4**. By this point you should have some sense of points i-v above (which will also help to inform your choice of papers for the data replication assignment, see below).

I will randomly assign you to two groups for the purpose of submitting your proposals and workshopping them in-class. Group I will submit their prospectus to the whole class by **Monday, April 5** and each person will prepare a 15 minute in-class presentation for **Thursday, April 8**. Group II will submit their prospectus to the whole class by **Monday, April 12** and will present on **Thursday, April 16**. The final (revised) draft of the prospectus is due for everyone on **Monday, April 26**.

- **Replication and extension assignment (30%):** Replication, or the practice of verifying and sometimes extending the findings in published papers, plays a central role in increasing research transparency and the credibility of research findings. It is also an excellent way to practice implementing an empirical strategy and to think through issues of model estimation, robustness,

coding and measurement, etc. For this assignment, you will select one paper (several have been highlighted in the syllabus) and conduct both a replication (verifying the authors' main results with their data) and extension (motivating and implementing additional analysis that extends the main paper). Choose a paper that employs an empirical method that you are interested in using in your own research and perhaps that you want to propose for your research design (although that is not a requirement). More details on what is expected of the replication paper will be provided. These are due by **Thursday, March 25**.

- **Referee reports (10%):** In addition to writing your own research proposal, you will write referee reports on others' proposals. The purpose of these reports is to provide feedback both to help your classmates and to give you a chance to practice the valuable skill of constructive research criticism. While these reports count towards your own grade, I will also take them into account as peer assessments in grading the proposals you are reviewing. You will be writing a referee report for two classmates. I will assign those in Group II to write reports for two individuals in Group I. Those reports will be due on **Friday, April 10**. I will assign those in Group I to write reports for two individuals in Group II, due by **Friday, April 17**.
- **Participation (10%):** Attendance and active participation at weekly seminars is mandatory. Our weekly meetings will focus on in-depth discussions of the required readings. There will typically be about 4-5 readings each week. You should read these papers thoroughly and critically and come to class prepared to discuss. Your goal should be to understand the main contributions of the individual pieces as well as how they relate to one another (within a topic and across topics).

## Option 2

For this option you will be expected to fulfill the **participation (10%)** and **referee report (10%)** requirements as described above. In addition to that, you will be expected to write a **full research paper (80%)** on a topic of your choosing. Your research paper should: motivate the research question, present the theory or hypotheses for testing, describe the identification or empirical strategy, perform the data analysis and discuss the results, and specify the overall contribution of the paper to the literature. You will be randomly assigned to Group I or II and should plan to submit a draft of your paper to the class and do the presentation along with your group. The final draft of your paper will be due on **Sunday, April 26**. Before taking this option, you should meet with me to discuss to make sure this is the appropriate choice and you should also plan on meeting with me once during the semester to discuss your progress.

## READINGS

The syllabus is long but don't be intimidated! The recommended readings are meant to be a reference for those who want to dive deeper on any particular subject. All students *are* responsible, however, to do the required readings (denoted with an asterisk \*) before class. You should read these papers thoroughly and critically and come to class prepared to discuss them on theoretical and empirical grounds.

Several readings on this list are quite challenging and might expose you to approaches that you have not previously encountered in-depth. We will spend a fair amount of time discussing the empirical analysis in these papers so do your best while reading them. At the end of the syllabus is a list of recommended methods readings that you can refer to throughout the course to learn more about these methods. While I will provide short methods lectures in the weeks they are introduced, you should also plan to work independently to try to understand this material.

Most of the readings are articles that can be found online and are available for free. Book chapters that are required reading will be posted online on CourseWeb.

## SCHEDULE OF SESSIONS AND DEADLINES

Below is a summary of the schedule for the semester. Please note dates that we will not have class as well as well as due dates for assignments.

- **Session 1 [Jan 08]:** What is development and how do we study it?
- **Session 2 [Jan 15]:** Historical legacies – *Notify me of your grading option*
- **Session 3 [Jan 22]:** State capacity
- **Session 4 [Jan 29]:** Democracy, dictatorship, and development
- **Session 5 [Feb 05]:** Causes of democracy – *Draft lit review/question memo due*
- **Session 6 [Feb 12]:** Accountability
- **Session 7 [Feb 19]:** Clientelism
- **Session 8 [Feb 26]:** Bureaucratic performance
- **Session 9 [Mar 04]:** Ethnic politics – *Research proposal memo due*
- **Thursday, March 11:** *No class (Spring Break)*
- **Session 10 [Mar 18]:** Natural resources
- **Session 11 [Mar 25]:** Conflict – *Replication assignment due*
- **Session 12 [Apr 01]:** Aid
- **Monday, Apr 5:** *Group I proposals due*
- **Session 13 [Apr 08]:** Group I presentations
- **Friday, Apr 10:** *Referee reports for Group I due*
- **Monday, Apr 13:** *Group II research proposals due*
- **Session 14 [Apr 15]:** Group II presentations
- **Friday, Apr 17:** *Referee reports for Group II due*
- **Sunday, Apr 26:** *Final research proposals/papers due*

## SCHEDULE OF READINGS

### Session 1 [Jan 8]: What is development and how do we study it?

#### *Conceptualizing (and measuring) development*

- \*Acemoglu, Daron. 2008. *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*: Chapter 1 (pp. 3-27).
- \*Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. Chapters 1-2 (pp. 13-53).

#### *Macro vs. micro approaches to studying development and the causal inference revolution*

- \*Adam, Christopher and Stefan Dercon. 2009. “The political economy of development: an assessment” *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* 25(2): 173-189. (Just read 173-179).
- \*Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. 2012. *Poor Economics: A radical rethinking of the way to fight global poverty*. Public Affairs. Chapter 10: 235-265 (skim).
- \*Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein. 2009. “Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development” *Annual Review of Political Science* 12(1): 367-378.
- \*Humphreys, Macartan and Alex Scacco. 2020. “The Aggregation Challenge” *World Development* 127: 1-3.
- \*Deaton, Angus. 2010. “Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development” *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(2): 424-455.

#### ***Recommended***

- Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. 2009. “The Experimental Approach to Development Economics,” *The Annual Review of Economics*, pp. 151-178.
- Deaton, Angus. 2005. “Measuring Poverty in a Growing World (Or Measuring Growth in a Poor World)” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(1): 1-19.
- Dunning, Thad. 2012. *Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge University Press: Chapter 1 (pp. 1-38).
- Imbens, Guido. 2010. “Better LATE than Nothing: Some Comments on Deaton (2009) and Heckman and Urzua (2009),” *Journal of Economic Literature* 48(2): 399-423.
- Pritchett, Lant. 1997. “Divergence, Big Time” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 11(3): 3-17.

### Session 2 [Jan 15]: Historical legacies

- \*Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics” *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 251-267.

- \*Acemoglu and Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation” *American Economic Review* 91: 1369-1401.
- \*Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer. 2005. “History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of the Colonial Land Tenure System in India” *American Economic Review* 95(4): 1190-1213.
- \*Nunn, Nathan. 2008. “The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(1): 139-176.
- \*Dell, Melissa, Nathan Lane and Pablo Querubin. 2018. “The Historical State, Local Collective Action, and Economic Development in Vietnam” *Econometrica* 86(6): 2083-2121.

### ***Recommended***

- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2006. “De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence” *American Economic Review* 96(2): 325-330.
- Acemoglu, Daron and Simon Johnson and James Robinson. 2005. “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth,” *Handbook of Economic Growth*: 385-472.
- Acemoglu, Daron Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4): 1231-1294.
- Banerjee, Abhijit, Lakshmi Iyer and Rohini Somanathan. 2005. “History, Social Divisions and Public Goods in Rural India,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 3: 639-647.
- Dell, Melissa. 2010. “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita,” *Econometrica* 78(6): 1863-1903.
- Dell, Melissa. 2012. “Path Dependence in Development: Evidence from the Mexican Revolution” *Working paper*.
- Engerman, Stanley and Kenneth Sokoloff. 2008. “Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and Economic Development: Theory, History, and Findings” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 119-135.
- Hariri, Jacob Gerner. 2012. “The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood” *American Political Science Review* 106: 471-494.
- Huillery, Elise. 2009. “History Matters: The Long-Term Impact of Colonial Public Investments in French West Africa” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 1(2): 176-215.
- Kuran, Timur. 2003. “The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic Underdevelopment in the Middle East,” *Journal of Economic History* 63(2): 414-446.
- Iyer, Lakshmi. 2010. “Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences” *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 92(4): 693-713.

- Lowes, Sara, Nathan Nunn, James Robinson, and Jonathan Weigel. 2017. “The Evolution of Culture and Institutions: Evidence from the Kuba Kingdom” 85(4): 1065-1091.
- Mahoney, James. 2001. “Path-dependent explanations of regime change” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36(1): 111-41.
- Michalopoulos, Stelios and Elias Papaioannou. 2013. “Pre-Colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development” *Econometrica* 81(1).
- North, Douglass. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press.
- Nunn, Nathan. 2009. “The Importance of History for Economic Development,” *Annual Review of Economics* 1(1): 65-92.
- Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa” *American Economic Review* 101(7): 3221-3252.
- Tabellini, Guido. 2010. “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8(4): 677-716.

### **Session 3 [Jan 22]: State capacity**

- \*Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992* (especially 67-95).
- \*North, Douglass and Barry Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England,” *The Journal of Economic History* XLIX(4): 803-832.
- \*Herbst, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press (especially 3-58).
- \*Sanchez de la Sierra, Raul. 2019. “On the Origins of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo” *Journal of Political Economy*.
- \*Jonathan Weigel. 2017. “Building State and Citizen: How Tax Collection in Congo Engenders Citizen Engagement with the State” (*job market paper*).

### **Recommended**

- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson and Rafael Santos. 2013. “The Monopoly of Violence: Evidence from Colombia,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 11: 5-44.
- Acemoglu, Daron and C. Garcia-Jimeno and James Robinson. 2015. “State Capacity and Economic Development: A Network Approach” *American Economic Review* 105(8): 2364-2409.
- Banerjee, Abhijit and Esther Duflo. 2014. “Under the Thumb of History? Political Institutions and the Scope for Action,” *Annual Review of Economics* 6: 951-971.

- Bates, Robert. 2008. "State Failure," *Annual Review of Political Science* 11: 1-12.
- Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson. 2009. "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics" *American Economic Review* 99(4): 1218-1244.
- Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson. 2010. "State Capacity, Conflict, and Development," *Econometrica* 78(1): 1-34.
- Centeno, Miguel Angel. 1997. "Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America" *The American Journal of Sociology* 102 (6): 1565-1605. (skim).
- Doner, Richard and Bryan Ritchie and Dan Slater. 2005. "Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective," *International Organization* 59: 327-361.
- Evans, Peter. 1995. *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*. Princeton University Press.
- Jackson, Robert and Carl Rosberg. 1986. "Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 24(1), pp. 1-31.
- Jackson, Robert and Carl Rosberg. 1982. "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics* 35(1): 1-24.
- Kohli, Atul. 2004. *State Directed Development*.
- Robinson, James. 2002. "States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey Herbst: A Review Essay" *Journal of Economic Literature* XL: 510-519.
- Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. 2012. "Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation," *American Political Science Review* 106(1): 81-102.
- Spruyt, Hendrik. 2002. "The Origins, Development, and Possible Decline of the Modern State," *Annual Review of Political Science* 5: 127-149.

#### **Session 4 [Jan 29]: Democracy, dictatorship, and development**

- \*Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *American Political Science Review*, 87:567-576.
- \*Doner, Richard and Bryan Ritchie and Dan Slater. 2005. "Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective," *International Organization* 59: 327-361.
- \*Acemoglu, Daron and Suresh Naidu and Pascual Restrepo and James Robinson. 2019. "Democracy Does Cause Growth" *Journal of Political Economy* 127(1): 47-100.
- \*Fujiwara, Thomas. 2015. "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil" *Econometrica* 83(2):423-464.



- \*Olken, Ben. 2010. “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” *American Political Science Review* 104(2): 243-267.

### ***Recommended***

- Acemoglu, Daron and T. Reed and James Robinson. 2014. “Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone,” *Journal of Political Economy* 122(2): 319-368.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2006. “Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective,” *American Political Science Review* 100(1): 115-131.
- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson and Thierry Verdier. 2004. “Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule” *Alfred Marshall Lecture Journal of the European Economic Association* 2(2-3): 162-192.
- Boix, Carles and Milan Svolik. 2013. “The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships,” *The Journal of Politics* 75:300-316.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith and Randolph Silverson and James Morrow. 2005. *The Logic of Political Survival*.
- **Replication:** Harding, Robin and David Stasavage. 2012. “What Democracy Does (And Doesn’t Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections” *Journal of Politics* 76(1): 229-245.
- Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler, and Anh Tran. 2012. “The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly,” *American Political Science Review*, 106:762-786.
- [Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padro I Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. 2014. “Political Reform in China: Elections, Public Goods, and Income Distribution \(available at SSRN\).](#)
- Padro i Miquel, Gerard. 2008. “The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear,” *Review of Economic Studies* 74(4): 1259-1274.
- Papaioannou, Elias and Gregorios Siourounis. 2008. “Democratisation and Growth” *The Economic Journal* 118: 1520-1551.
- Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. Chapters 6-7 (pp. 146-188).
- Tsai, Lily. 2007. “Solidary Groups, Informal Accountability, and Local Public Goods Provision in Rural China,” *American Political Science Review* 101(2): 355-372.

## Week 5 [Feb 5]: Democratization

- \*Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2009. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, especially Chapter 1-4 (pp. 1-117).
- \*Aidt, Toke and Raphael Franck. 2015. "Democratization and the Threat of Revolution: Evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832" *Econometrica* 83(2): 505-547.
- \*Papaioannou, Elias and Gregorios Siourounis. 2008. "Economic and Social Factors Driving the Third Wave of Democratization" *Journal of Comparative Economics* 36: 365-387.
- \*Friedman, Willa, Michael Kremer, Edward Miguel, Rebecca Thornton. 2011. "Education as Liberation" No. w16939. *National Bureau of Economic Research*.

### *Recommended*

- Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.
- Boix, Carles. 2011. "Democracy, Development, and the International System," *American Political Science Review* 105(4): 809-28.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Pierre Yared. 2008. "Income and Democracy," *American Economic Review* 98(3): 808-842.
- Bruckner, M and Ciccone, A. 2011. "Rain and the Democratic Window of Opportunity," *Econometrica* 79(3): 923-947.
- Przeworski, Adam and Michael Alvarez and Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960/1981. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour. 1959. "Some Social Prerequisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53:69-105.
- Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico. 2004. "Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's 'Age of Reform'" *Journal of Economic History* 64(2): 707-765.
- Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Beacon Press.

## Week 6 [Feb 12]: Accountability (and information)

- \*Fearon, James. 1999. "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians" in *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation* edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. pp. 55-97.
- \*Wittman, Donald. 1989. "Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results" *Journal of Political Economy* 97(6): 1395-1424.
- \*Ferraz, Claudio and Fred Finan. 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes" *Quarterly Journal of Economic* 123(2): 703-745.
- \***Replication:** Chong, Alberto, Ana de la O, Dean Karlan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2015. "Does Corruption Information Inspire the Fight or Quash the Hope? A Field Experiment in Mexico on Voter Turnout, Choice, and Party Identification" *Journal of Politics* 77(1): 55-71.
- \*Dunning, Thad, Guy Grossman, Macartan Humphreys, Susan Hyde, Craig McIntosh, and Gareth Nellis. 2019. *Information, Accountability, and Learning: Lessons from Metaketa I*. Cambridge University Press. See also Dunning et al. 2019. "Voter Information Campaigns and Political Accountability: Cumulative Findings from a Pre-Registered Meta-Analysis of Coordinated Trials" *Science Advances* 5(eaaw2612).

## Recommended

- Banerjee, Abhijit et al. 2014. "Are Poor Voters Indifferent to Whether Elected Leaders are Criminal or Corrupt? A Vignette Experiment in Rural India," *Political Communications* 41: 391-407.
- Besley, Timothy. 2006. *Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government*. Oxford University Press.
- Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(1): 85-114.
- Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess. 2002. "The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(4): 1415-1451.
- Besley, Timothy. 2005. "Political Selection," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19(3): 43-60.
- Callen, Michael and James Long. 2015. "Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," *American Economic Review* 105: 354-381.
- **Replication:** Gottlieb, Jessica. Forthcoming. "Greater Expectations: A Field Experiment to Improve Accountability in Mali" *American Journal of Political Science* 60(1): 143-157.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy Weinstein. 2012. "Policing Politicians: Citizen Empowerment and Political Accountability in Uganda" (unpublished paper).

- Liaquat, Asad. 2019. “No Representation without Information: Politician Responsiveness to Citizen Preferences” *Working paper available [here](#)*.
- Olken, Ben. 2007. “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” *Journal of Political Economy* 115(2): 200-249.
- Pande, Rohini. 2011. “Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies” *Annual Review of Economics* 3: 215-237.
- Raghobendra, Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo. 2004. “Women as Policymakers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India” *Econometrica* 72(5): 1409-1443.

### Week 7 [Feb 19]: Clientelism

- \*Stokes, Susan and Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press: Chapters 1-3, skim 6 and 8.
- \*Anderson, Siwan, Patrick Francois, and Ashok Kotwal. 2015. “Clientelism in Indian Villages” *American Economic Review* 105(6): 1780-1816.
- \*Leonard Wantchekon. 2003. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin,” *World Politics*, 55:399-422.
- Fujiwara, Thomas and Leonard Wantchekon. 2013. “Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin,” *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*. 5(4): 241-255.

### Recommended

- Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2004. "Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine electoral market." *American Journal of Political Science* 48.4: 742-757.
- Cammett, Melani and Sukriti Issar. 2010. “Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logic of Welfare Allocation in Lebanon,” *World Politics* 62(3): 381-421.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2007. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge University Press.
- De la O, Ana. 2013. “Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57(1): 1-14.
- **Replication:** Gottlieb, Jessica. 2017. “Explaining Variation in Broker Strategies: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Senegal,” *Comparative Political Studies* 50(11): 1556-1592.
- Hicken, Allen. 2011. “Clientelism” *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 289-310.

- Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven Wilkinson. 2007. "Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction," in *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition* (ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson). Cambridge University Press.
- Manzetti, Luigi and Carole Wilson. 2007. "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?" *Comparative Political Studies* 40: 949-970.
- Nichter, Simeon. 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot," *American Political Science Review*, 102:19-31.
- Robinson, James and Thierry Verdier. 2013. "The Political Economy of Clientelism," *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 115:260-291.
- Stokes, Susan. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," *American Political Science Review*, 99:315-325.

### **Week 8 [Feb 26]: Bureaucratic Performance**

- \*Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishney. 1993. "Corruption," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108(3): 599-617.
- \*Bertrand, Marianne, Djankov, Simeon, Hanna, Rema and Mullainathan, Sendhil, (2007) "Obtaining a Driver's License in India: An Experimental Approach to Studying Corruption," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 122(4), 1639-1676.
- Gulzar, Saad and Benjamin Pasquale. 2017. "Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India" *American Political Science Review* 111(1): 162-183.
- Raffler, Pia. 2019. "Does Political Oversight of the Bureaucracy Increase Accountability? Field Experimental Evidence from an Electoral Autocracy" *Working paper available [here](#)*.
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## ADDITIONAL READINGS

### Methods

#### *Causal Inference (general)*

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- Gerber, Alan and Donald Green. 2012. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation*. W.W. Norton and Co.
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